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PREFACE
This series is principally concerned with current policy issues of
importance to developing countries but also covers those relevant to
countries in transition. The focus is upon policies which affect the
management of natural resources in support of sustainable livelihoods.
Much of the series will be devoted to concerns affecting the livelihoods of
poor people in rural areas, recognizing the linkages with non-natural
resource-based livelihoods. It will also include the interests of the urban
poor, where these are linked to the use of natural resources as part of
livelihood strategies.
The series will take a holistic view and cover both the economic and social
components affecting livelihoods, and associated factors notably with
respect to health and education. The aim is to provide topical analyses
which are based upon field research where appropriate, and which will
inform development practitioners concerned with issues of poverty in
development.
The series is timely, given the increasing focus upon poverty and poverty
elimination in the agenda of the development community. It is also timely
with respect to the growing body of recent work which seeks to replace
earlier, simplistic structural adjustment programmes, with more flexible
approaches to livelihoods, institutions and partnerships.
Policy analysis is often assumed to be the remit of social scientists alone.
Whilst it is recognized that social science may play a pivotal role,
interactions with other disciplines may also be critical in understanding and
analysing policy issues of importance to the poor. The series therefore
draws upon a wide range of social and natural scientific disciplines
reflecting the resource base at the Natural Resources Institute.
iv
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The persistence of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be attributed to a
single cause; its roots are multiple, complex and inter-related. Institutions,
as formal organizations, informal community groups and networks, or the
rules and traditions that guide the actions which affect the lives of the
poor, are influential, however. They may help preserve the status quo or
they may be a powerful force for change – and their role is crucial in the
implementation of poverty reduction programmes and policies. The focus
of this paper is the development of organizations to enhance their capacity
to include the rural poor.
In Africa, as elsewhere, people are dependent on a range of formal and
informal institutions. Yet the inter-related consequences of poverty, poor
infrastructure, physical remoteness and policy reversals have left many
parts of rural Africa rather more dependent on informal traditional
institutions than formal commercial or public organizations. In the wake of
independence, many countries adopted control economy policies which
stifled entrepreneurship, but offered often unreliable and patchy public
services. Subsequent reforms have led to partial state withdrawal from
many activities, only to expose an understandable reticence on the part of
the commercial sector to take on a significant role in areas perceived to be
unprofitable or risky. As a consequence, Africa’s rural poor are poorly
served by formal institutions.
The paper explores three key components of improved institutional
performance: (i) increased participation that allows the poor greater
influence in decision-making; (ii) improved institutional capacity, i.e., the
ability to deliver effectively, efficiently and with accountability; and (iii) the
definition of appropriate roles for the range of institutions on which the
poor depend. A new model is emerging based on a reduced but essential
1
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role for the state, with an emphasis on partnerships and a broader
interface with civil society. A professionally functioning, flexible institutional
framework is required, combining decentralized government, non-
governmental organizations private sector (possibly in partnership with the
state), and the empowerment of community-based informal organizations.
Change will inevitably take time and require some fundamental attitudinal
shifts. Practical steps are proposed in two principal action areas: inter-
institutional – co-ordination of policy development and vertical integration;
and intra-institutional – capacity-building through the development of
management tools and systems. Improved co-ordination will require close
consultation between institutions and a broad interface with the target
group. Genuine decentralization can facilitate this approach, but it must be
supported by a needs-driven capacity building programme.
Donors can help promote the development of appropriate institutions with
discriminating use of loan and grant funds channelled selectively through
local organizations. They must also look to their processes – to improve
their own co-ordination to reinforce their programmes and prevent
duplication.
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1
INTRODUCTION
SCOPE
This paper is about institutional development and how it relates to rural
poverty. It explores the different and complementary roles of public/private,
profit/non-profit making and community-based organizations. It proposes
steps which can be taken to improve institutional performance, and the
role of technical assistance in this process.
This paper is one of a series which seeks to elaborate the relationship
between poverty, rural livelihoods and key policy areas. The papers are
intended for a wide audience in developing country governments, donor
agencies, research institutes and other organizations concerned with
development or governance. They are intended to contribute to increased
focus on poverty in development by informing and stimulating debate,
policy and action amongst key players in the development process.
This paper was originally prepared as a briefing paper for the European
Union (EU). The EU briefing papers have sub-Saharan Africa as their
primary focus, though case study material may also be drawn from other
African/Caribbean/Pacific country experience. The information they contain
is based principally on a review of secondary data and documentation,
although some specific aspects have been explored through short,
focused field studies.
Following this brief introduction, the second section examines how policy
and capacity weaknesses constrain poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan
Africa. The third section reviews experience of poverty-focused change in
government and private institutions: it explores the benefits that may be
obtained from public/private partnerships, and scope to scale up
3
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successful initiatives. The fourth section elaborates recommendations for
constructive change in government organizations and NGOs focusing on
the scope for change within organizations, and in their relations with other
organizations, as well as the need to amplify the voice of the rural poor.
The concluding section underlines the challenges implicit in the
institutional development agenda.
WHAT IS MEANT BY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT?
Until recently, reference to institutions invariably concerned organizations,
and this is what is usually meant by institutional strengthening or
institutional development. Organizations may be formal (such as an area
development committee, or a development bank, or a cooperative) or
informal (such as self-help groups, or the household or extended family).
Improving institutional performance encompasses consideration of
effectiveness (‘doing the right thing’), efficiency (not using significantly
more resources than necessary), and accountability (to stakeholders).
The term institutional development is usually applied to formal
organizations, because these are amenable to deliberate attempts to
improve performance, and because it is a concept and term borne of
development, governance and management specialists. Yet increasingly,
models of institutional development seek to exploit synergies between
formal and informal, commercial and non-profit, government and non-
government and in so doing, draw in more and more institutions.
Institutions in the rural sector are as diverse as the sector itself. Box 1 lists
institutions which are present in rural economies, and which represent, link
or deliver services to rural populations.
Some institutions are more important to the poorest. The variable and
often disappointing performance to date in serving the needs of the poor
means that the importance of different institutions varies from place to
place. Yet it is important that any process to strengthen rural institutions
should include some of the organizations with a broader remit, or else the
process may become fragmented and unworkable. Examples of
institutions important to the poor include:
. self-help groups, savings groups and credit unions;
. rural transport providers;
4
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Box 1 Institutions in rural economies
Category Institutions
Private individual Household, extended family, residential area
Workers groups and unions
Private trader (and other commercial) networks
Personal networks
Daily or periodic markets
Local development committees
Informal financial sector
Self-help groups
Employers (as an institution for employees)
Cooperatives
Political parties
Religious groups
Private commercial sector Banks
Chamber of Commerce
Trade Associations:
– formal sector
– informal sector
Large companies
Transport companies (could be public)
Commercial networks based on ethnicity
Radio and newspapers (could be public)
Non-governmental organizations Individual national NGOs
Coordinating organizations for NGOs
International NGOs
International NGOs with local NGO networks
Public sector Banks
Utility companies
Health and education services
Local government (decentralization)
Business development services
Universities and research organizations
Agricultural extension services
Political Political parties
– national office
– regional offices
External Foreign traders and investors
Investors and traders from outside the area
Personal networks (migration/remittances)
Donors
5
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. large employers of unskilled labour;
. religious groups;
. cooperatives;
. local development committees;
. local government, especially education and health services for women;
. external traders who buy local products;
. private networks for migration and remittances;
. private networks based on household, family or residence;
. radio;
. NGOs; and
. daily or periodic markets.
Given that the focus here is on institutional development, this paper
adheres to ‘institutions as organizations’. However, for completeness it is
important to distinguish between this meaning and the wider interpretation
of institutions, which is finding increasing currency as a result of growing
interest in New Institutional Economics.
‘‘[North] defines institutions as ‘the rules of the game’ in a society,
which guide, and reduce uncertainty in, human interaction. Institutions
may be formal or informal. Formal institutions include a hierarchy of
laws and policies, beginning with by-laws and progressing through
national laws, policies and the national constitution, up to international
laws and treaties. Informal institutions include social customs and
conventions, which, because they are often deeply embedded in
culture, are more resistant to change than formal institutions, which
can be overturned by a revolution, presidential edict, government
policy change or the passage of a new law.’’ (Dorward et al., 1998, p.
11, citing North, 1990)
‘‘. . . in North’s analysis, institutions – ‘the rules of the games’ – are
distinguished from organizations, such as firms, community groups
or government agencies – the ‘players’ in the game.’’ (Ibid, p. 12)
These institutions and organizations sometimes overlap. For example:
government agencies (organizations) often define the rules (institutions);
and relationships between members of an organization are governed by a
code of convention or rules (either explicit or implicit) (Dorward et al.,
1998). Any constructive analysis of organizations therefore soon strays
into the sphere of ‘new’ (broad sense) institutions.
6
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2
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM:
INSTITUTIONS AND POVERTY
THE DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Persistent poverty pervades Africa. Despite large inflows of aid, and the
advances made in other regions in reducing poverty and promoting
economic growth, economic growth rates in most sub-Saharan African
countries have hardly kept pace with population growth. Instead, the post-
independence period has been characterized by economic, social and
political instability, with increasing incidence of poverty and food insecurity.
In recent years there has been a growing consensus that Africa faces an
institutional crisis (see for example Thomas-Slayter, 1994; Dia, 1996) and
that sustainable development goals can be achieved only through
concerted efforts to address institutional failings.
A narrow definition of poverty characterizes the poor according to their
inability to generate income and to consume. However, poverty is
increasingly considered to be a much broader concept, encompassing
access to resources, assets and services, as well as the less tangible
concepts of dignity and autonomy (Baulch, 1996, p. 2). Production
limitations remain a fundamental component of poverty. The majority of the
poor are substantially dependent upon the renewable natural resources
(RNR) sector for their livelihoods, and many live in low-potential or
marginal areas. Agriculture, pastoralism, fisheries and forests provide,
directly or indirectly, a large part of the means of survival for the poor, as
well as food for both rural and urban poor. (Poorer people spend a higher
proportion of their income on food, and most of this expenditure is on
locally produced products.)
7
P
O
L
IC
Y
S
E
R
IE
S
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS02 - 130399/NRI Institutional Development.3d
29/5/01 09:21 By Colin Wragg Page 12
Institutional development to reduce poverty necessitates a gender
perspective. The majority of the poor in sub-Saharan Africa are women.
Moreover, their role in the RNR sector is vitally important. The UN
Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that 70% of the absolute poor
are women, with female-headed households amongst the poorest and
most vulnerable in most communities, and that women provide
approximately 70% of total agricultural labour. Furthermore, the experience
of poverty is profoundly different for men and women. Policy makers and
programme designers must take account of the gender-differentiated
nature of poverty and productive activities in the RNR sector if they are to
make serious inroads on poverty in Africa.
Poverty reduction is not a means of securing gender equality, as the
subordination of women is not caused by poverty. However, actions that do not
address both poverty and gender-specific poverty problems simultaneously are
unlikely to have a significant impact. The recommendations made below
concerning increased public action and improved institutional performance can
succeed only if gender issues are central to implementation.
Furthermore, in considering poverty the RNR sector should not be viewed in
isolation from other sectors such as health, education and industry, with which
there are important poverty-reducing synergies. Few of the experiences and
recommendations elaborated in this paper are limited to the RNR sector in
their applications, and the importance of cross-sector approaches is stressed.
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE AND THE POOR
. . . African governments have behaved in ways which are damaging
to the long-term interests of the majority of their populations
because they have served narrow constituencies. (Collier and
Gunning, 1997, p. 1)
The extent of ‘government failure’ in SSA is well-established . . . it is
not difficult to cite examples of chronic over-staffing of public
institutions, which have grown alarmingly fast and yet produce less
. . . (Thirtle and Echeverria, 1994, p. 31)
. . . states have literally collapsed, and along with them, the
organizations charged with carrying out routine and development-
oriented functions. (Grindle, 1997, p. 481)
8
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It is useful to distinguish between different aspects of institutional failure
because this highlights the nature of change required to address poverty
in sub-Saharan Africa more effectively. (There is an obvious danger in
generalizations. Sub-Saharan Africa is a diverse region, experiencing a
multiplicity of environmental, social and economic conditions which
obviously have implications for institutional development. However, there
are some common characteristics of institutional failure and some
principles for institutional development that have wide applicability.)
Institutions have failed across all sectors and for the vast majority of the
African population, not only for the poor, and it is therefore difficult to
isolate those failings specific to the RNR sector and to poverty. However,
key components of institutional failure are outlined here, along with their
impact on the poor. This provides the building blocks for the analyses and
recommendations in subsequent sections.
Policy failure
Government organizations are largely responsible for policy. Policy
analysis and development is therefore an important part of institutional
development. Yet policies are often poorly designed for tackling poverty.
Failure to understand the needs of the poor
Appropriate policy comes from an understanding of the issues which it is
intended to address. Poor understanding of poverty and gender issues
clearly inhibits the design of appropriate policies and programmes to
address poverty. Box 2 describes the complexity and dynamic nature of
poverty. Simplistic definitions fail to capture some of the key aspects of
poverty and policies based on such definitions are unlikely to succeed.
Box 3 lists causes of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.
The effectiveness of anti-poverty policies is jeopardized by insufficient
information on the needs of the poor. Lack of awareness of the needs of
society has exacerbated inappropriate public-sector responses to those
needs. The prevalence of a ‘state knows best’ ethic has led to top-down
institutional structures for policy planning and implementation. The failure
is two-fold: in the mechanisms for understanding poverty and the needs of
the poor; and in the mechanisms for transferring this information to policy-
makers.
9
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Box 2 Poverty concepts
Poverty and degrees of poverty are not concepts which are easy to pin
down, let alone quantify. What is required is a clear perspective on
people who live in poverty so that policy makers can understand the
underlying issues. When these are understood the planners, together
with the poor, can design realistic and feasible projects. These will
provide indicators of activity and output which are meaningful both to
the poor and to development practitioners.
Poverty cannot be tied down to groups or places – it is pervasive. It
turns up in varying degrees in all corners of the globe. It is relative and
contextual. The poor cannot be listed. People are constantly moving
into and out of poverty or between different levels of poverty.
Purposefully vague terms such as the poor, rather poor and very poor
(Lipton and Maxwell, 1992, p. 10) can provide food for thought rather
than answers. These terms stimulate learning processes. The best
place to learn is with the poor themselves.
Box 3 Causes of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa
. inadequate access to employment opportunities
. inadequate physical assets, such as land and capital, and minimal
access to credit even on a small scale
. inadequate access to the means of supporting rural development
in poor regions
. inadequate access to markets where the poor can sell goods and
services
. low endowment of human capital
. destruction of natural resources, leading to environmental
degradation and reduced productivity
. inadequate access to assistance for those living at the margin and
those subject to transitory poverty
. lack of participation; failure to draw the poor into the design of
development programmes
Adapted from World Bank (1996) p. 3
10
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS02 - 130399/NRI Institutional Development.3d
29/5/01 09:21 By Colin Wragg Page 15
Policy reversals
Approaches to sustainable development (broadly speaking, growth with
equity) have differed markedly. Central to the debate are the respective
roles of the state and the market, and their impact on economic growth
and poverty reduction. In sub-Saharan Africa, the post-independence
period was initially characterized by excessive state intervention in the
economy, followed by rapid (but patchy) liberalization and deregulation
with a dependence on the market as the ‘engine’ of economic
development (minimalist state intervention). This trend has been witnessed
in all sectors of the economy, and has had a major impact on the RNR
sector, for instance in agricultural input supply and marketing. More
recently, there has been a ‘softening’ of this position, acknowledging an
important role for the state in selected areas (see e.g. World Bank,
1997a).
State intervention in markets was considered necessary to promote
national development. For instance, state intervention in agricultural input
and output marketing was considered desirable so that inputs would be
affordable, output prices guaranteed, and marketing services available to
farmers, even in remote areas. Yet this public enterprise was often
inefficient and ultimately fiscally unsustainable. Parastatal marketing
boards often paid farmers poor prices (and often paid them late), and
inputs, though in principle cheap, were often not available.
As a result, distorted pricing policies, inefficiencies, poor management and
ineffective delivery systems had the opposite effect, and economic growth
and equity goals were never reached, leading to a call for the reform of
the state (see e.g. the so-called Berg report: World Bank, 1981). Although
the inefficient parastatals, budgetary deficits and deteriorating external
trade balances provided ample local justification for the reforms proposed,
they were also an echo of the global shift towards slimmer government
and unfettered (or at least, less-fettered) capitalism.
Even the poor would benefit from the reforms, it was argued, because
economic growth would ‘trickle down’, reducing inequality, and is in any
case a prerequisite. Yet in the agricultural sector, which is key to most
economies in sub-Saharan Africa, the response to economic liberalization
was uneven, and often disappointing. Some export sectors performed well,
benefiting from devaluation (and hence more competitive export prices),
11
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competition amongst traders (and hence higher farm-gate prices), and
selective investment in infrastructure. The supply response in the food-
crop sector has been less encouraging, and poor farmers in remote areas
have often found themselves particularly ill-served by private input
suppliers and agricultural traders. Another major area in which economic
reforms have given rise to concern is in their impact on particularly poor or
vulnerable groups. (These two areas for concern are linked, moreover,
because most of Africa’s poor are still rural, and within the rural sector
they are likely to be those in more remote or agro-ecologically marginal
areas, less able to benefit from export marketing reforms.) The second
wave of adjustment programmes therefore often included a ‘social
dimensions of adjustment’ component, aimed at identifying and protecting
the vulnerable from the worst impacts of the reforms.
There was therefore much concern that the reforms seriously jeopardized
the services available to poor people in rural areas. NGOs and community
organizations were sometimes able to fill this void, but even their
performance in providing for the poorest has been mixed (Farrington and
Bebbington, 1993). Excessive privatization, especially in the context of
states with weak regulatory and monitoring systems, has led to wealth
polarization and environmental degradation (Martin, 1993). These are the
concerns which underpin the current shift to recognizing an important role
for the state in selected areas, and no longer stressing a ‘minimalist state’
(reflected in the 1997 World Development Report: World Bank, 1997a).
Institutional incompatibility
The incompatibility of institutions has been identified as a major contributor
to the current institutional crisis:
[The origin of institutional crisis is] the structural and functional
disconnect between informal, indigenous institutions rooted in the
region’s history and culture, and formal institutions mostly
transplanted from outside. This institutional disconnect is shown to
have several manifestations: the disjunctions between the state and
civil society, between formal and informal private institutions, and
between corporate and societal cultures. ‘Institutional reconciliation’
between these levels is advocated as the key to resolving the crisis.
(Dia, 1996)
12
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There is also distrust and lack of understanding between the state and the
private sector, due in part to the public versus private debate, sometimes
exacerbated by ethnic tensions. Poor relationships between the state and
NGOs sometimes result from fears that NGOs fuel popular revolt, and
from conflicts between their respective poverty agendas, although there
is increasing evidence of collaboration and partnership. Institutional
incompatibility is not confined to government; it occurs between and within
all sectors.
There may be conflict between private and public interests in policy
development. The state itself may not be acting in the public interest, but
in the interests of individuals (bureaucrats and politicians) or in the
interests of influential groups in society. Organizations within the
commercial private sector generally only act in the public interest if this
also coincides with profit generation. Given this, it may be unrealistic to
expect too much involvement of the profit-seeking private sector in
providing services for the poor, who lack purchasing power, are considered
high risk, and demand goods and services only in small quantities.
Design and capacity failure
Even where appropriate policy is in place, the successful implementation
of policy cannot be taken for granted. This is often due to inappropriate
design or structure (the informal and formal rules which govern an
institution), poor capacity, or the complete absence of institutions which
provide a particular function or serve a particular group. This is particularly
pertinent when considering the rural poor, and more pointedly the rural
poorest, who are frequently excluded from institutions, whether formal or
informal, local or national. Even if capacities of existing institutions are
enhanced, there is no guarantee that they will ever cater for the poorest,
unless gaps are filled and mechanisms introduced and implemented which
will include the poor.
The ability to produce a desired outcome is to a large extent dependent
upon institutional design and/or capacity to function. Much of the focus of
institutional shortcomings in sub-Saharan Africa has been on the state.
Whatever developmental role the state has assumed, whether as an
economic manager, a regulator, a provider of public goods or a provider of
services, it has frequently failed to operate effectively due to various
internal, often structural, weaknesses. Budgetary constraints, poor
13
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monitoring, absence of staff performance incentives, lack of mechanisms
to identify and respond to needs, and low quality of physical and human
capital have all inhibited the capacity to act. Corruption is widespread, as
are staff dissatisfaction and low motivation. Corrupt systems compound
the exclusion of the poor, because the poor are unable to pay bribes.
The structure of organizations may be inappropriate to address poverty.
Highly centralized bureaucracies are not ideal for managing resources at
the local level and for responding to local needs. Despite efforts to
decentralize in many sub-Saharan African countries, in practice, power
has often remained at the centre.
Institutions that prioritize poverty reduction, such as NGOs, frequently lack
the human and financial resources to fulfil their missions other than on a
very small scale. Nor do they necessarily want to expand their operations
in a way that changes the nature of their organization. State withdrawal
from many activities has resulted in an increased onus on the private
sector to fill the void. Yet, unlike South-east Asia where this has taken
place, the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa has not risen to this
challenge.
Despite the widespread recognition of institutional failings and the
importance of institutional development in sustainable development and
poverty reduction, successes in implementing institutional development
strategies are few. World Bank evaluations frequently cite institutional
development as the key determinant in project performance:
. . . while components aimed at strengthening institutions feature in
a high proportion of Bank-financed operations, and the approaches
used in them are very diverse, many of the components are judged
not to have had lasting positive effects. In many of the countries that
most need it, there is rather little evidence of lasting achievement in
institutional development through Bank-supported operations. (Paul,
1990)
The following sections draw on lessons from experience to identify
practical steps which can be taken to improve institutional performance.
14
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3
TOWARDS A NEW INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK: LESSONS FROM
EXPERIENCE
This section explores three key components of institutional development:
. public participation, to provide direction and foster accountability;
. institutional capacity, focusing particularly on improved effectiveness,
efficiency and accountability;
. clearly defined roles and relationships between organizations.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Understanding poverty, identifying the poor and the nature of their poverty,
are prerequisites for the development of appropriate policies and
programmes to reduce poverty. (Some programmes which indirectly
reduce poverty, such as rural road construction and immunization, can be
implemented with a more basic understanding.) Addressing the needs of
the poor requires them to be more involved in policy development, project
planning, implementation and service delivery. This calls for mechanisms
that allow the poor greater influence in decision-making. Their role may be
either ‘collaborative’ or ‘adversary’, or a combination of the two (Dreze and
Sen, 1989). Both require that mechanisms for political activity are
accessible to the public. This is one of the main justifications for
decentralization of government, and working with representatives of the
poor such as NGOs and community groups. Such policies aim to increase
the interface between government institutions and the poor.
The poor tend to be more preoccupied with day-to-day matters. The fact
that the rural poor have little political power is recognized as a factor
15
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adversely affecting the implementation of development programmes
(World Bank, 1997b, p. 37). However, it is possible for the poor to
generate pressure for change through self-advocacy and greater, more
effective representation. Institutions can also create governance
mechanisms which rely on participation and feedback; these are discussed
later in this paper, in the context of accountability issues.
Self-advocacy
Self-advocacy involves people brought together by a common cause to
add strength to their position. As the example in Box 4 indicates, this need
not reflect a party political agenda, rather a common interest which can
transcend party political divisions.
Box 4 Examples of self-advocacy from Peru and Chile
One lesson that has emerged, especially from the examples of
Peruvian women and some of the organizations under the Chilean
dictatorship, is a different conception of solidarity. Solidarity is often
seen as something purely political. It is also often idealized and
romanticized. The solidarity shown between the women in Chile and in
Peru was based on practical as well as collective responses to
problems of daily survival. The women in Peru came together to find
land, build shelters and secure supplies of electricity and water.
Women’s clubs helped them cope with poverty and created ways of
generating income compatible with their other household roles.
Johnson (1992) p. 163
It is not easy for the poor to mobilize. If it were, it would have happened
more often. Serious obstacles and possible means of overcoming them
have been highlighted by Korten (1983) and are shown in Box 5. There
are two additional points worth stressing. Firstly, it is essential to recognize
that the poor are not a unified group. Secondly, the proposed mechanisms
require skilled practitioners and training. Agricultural extension
experiences, where the agent is technically capable but unable to function
with the poor and poorest, strongly support this notion.
What emerges is a strong need for human resource development, in
particular the capacity for prioritizing needs, and for advocacy. This is
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clearly not a government job but a role that could be undertaken effectively
through partner organizations such as NGOs, unions, cooperatives and
other grass-roots organizations. Technical assistance could be used to help
committed organizations develop the necessary skills.
Box 5 Community-level obstacles to mobilization and possible
mechanisms to overcome them
Obstacles Possiblemechanismstoovercomeobstacles
Lack of appropriate
community organization
Community organizer who works to spread
awareness of programme and to develop
needed organization or strengthen existing
organization
Lack of organizational
skills
Informal training by organizers helping
leaders plan meetings, bring issues to
membership, etc. Formal training in some
specific areas such as record keeping
Poor communication
facilities
Local organization builds communication
networks within its membership and breaks
down some tasks and discussions to smaller
groups that can meet more easily
Factionalism and differing
economic interests
Programme or project structured to minimize
need for cooperation among strongly
conflicting groups; incentives designed to
strengthen local organization; community
organizers support processes unifying
people who must cooperate
Corruption Procedures developed for system checks;
broad understanding developed among
members regarding nature of programmes
and members’ roles; member access to all
decision-making and organizational records
encouraged
Korten (1983) p. 190
Programmes can be designed and implemented with the aim of giving the
poor and poorest an opportunity to influence the agenda. However,
political will is key in supporting advocacy, and some governments may
distrust potentially destabilizing popular movements.
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Political representation
Representation in political circles is an important factor for the generation
of change. There are two main requirements for this to happen. Firstly, the
political structure needs to be such that it can represent the poor, who are
the section of society with the quietest voice. Secondly, there should be
incentives (not necessarily financial) for the politicians who represent the
poor. This applies equally to the ‘Champions and Change Agents’ (ODA,
1995) who work to build the enabling environment, who are adjudged as
achieving through representing the poor. Theoretically, in a properly
functioning, inclusive democracy (one in which the electorate are informed,
and exercise their voting rights without coercion), it is in the interest of
politicians to represent the poor, because they are a large constituency.
Yet in those same countries where the poor represent a large
constituency, there may also be widespread illiteracy, and a number of
economic and social pressures which limit or prejudice the participation of
the poor in the voting system.
Perhaps the most widely studied case of extending participatory structures
for political representation into villages is the Panchayati Raj (see e.g.
Bhatt, 1987). This has the laudable objective of representative government
by the people, but succeeds, as those familiar with rural India are well
aware, only when the actors find it to their advantage. The law is now
being changed further through the 74th Amendment to the Constitution,
which takes political representation down to the ward level (affecting larger
villages and urban areas) in an attempt by the Indian Government to give
the poorest a voice in the political arena and link them to the government
departments concerned with their well-being.
The Indian democratization experience gives reason for optimism. When
those involved in political decentralization want it to succeed, the result will
usually benefit those newly represented. However, political participation
requires more than the establishment of systems for political rights and
representation. In order to exercise their rights, the poor need the means
to articulate their demands. Mass illiteracy prevails in India. In the absence
of clear strategies to include the illiterate in these processes, the result is
their exclusion from effective participation (Dreze and Sen, 1989). As a
result, the full representation of the poor is still a long way off.
18
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS02 - 130399/NRI Institutional Development.3d
29/5/01 09:21 By Colin Wragg Page 23
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
Institutional capacity may be assessed according to its ability to deliver
effectively, efficiently and with accountability
Effectiveness
Effectiveness is the ability to meet goals and objectives. Public
participation and accountability mechanisms are needed to ensure that the
goals are appropriate. Internal systems and appropriate external linkages
are needed to ensure delivery on those goals.
A key aspect of effectiveness is recognizing where institutional
competence lies. For instance, it was noted above that community
organizations or NGOs are usually better placed than government agents
to mobilize community participation. The latter may not have gained the
trust of communities; may have little village-level presence; and may even
find such activities in conflict with other agendas. Similarly, if a policy
concerned with enhanced agricultural productivity and more use of
purchased inputs is to succeed, careful consideration should be given to
the choice of provider. Whilst state or NGO provision might be appropriate
in areas with poor access to markets, in other areas the commercial
sector (with its interests in profit and turnover), may do the job better and
more sustainably than non-commercial players.
NGOs and community organizations (which are often better positioned to
reach the poor) may provide a complement to state and private service
delivery. This role must be set in the context of a supportive environment
provided by the state, whether in direct partnership or in providing the
appropriate legislative framework and political will. Membership
organizations, ranging in size from individual villages to nationwide
programmes, have a role though many are localized community
organizations and cater only for a small proportion of farmers. These too
may be biased against poorer farmers. NGOs frequently try to direct
programmes towards the needs of relatively disadvantaged groups,
including women and the poor; nonetheless they are often unsuccessful in
reaching the poorest.
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Efficiency
Efficiency considerations largely concern the cost of goods and services.
The lower the cost of services, the greater is the ability of the poor to
afford them. Whether as purchasers of private goods, or taxpayers, or
users of public goods, there should be more goods and services available
to the poor if they are provided efficiently. [According to economic theory,
goods and services can be described as public or private goods,
depending on their properties. Key to this is excludability (the degree to
those who have not paid for a good can be excluded from consuming it)
and subtractability (the degree to which the use of a good or service
reduces its availability to another). Goods which are both highly excludable
and highly subtractable can usually be provided by the private sector, and
are known as private goods. (Carney, 1995a, p. 11)] Where the state has
undertaken semi-commercial operations, such as agricultural marketing
and input supply, it has often been justifiably criticized for running high-
cost, inefficient operations which penalize farmers by paying poor farm-
gate prices, and penalize consumers through the poor quality and
availability of the goods and services provided.
The evidence on NGO costs is scarce, but a review of successful NGO
projects (particularly those which had an impact on the poor and poorest)
found costs to be greater than originally thought because of high levels of
beneficiary and project staff participation, but small numbers of
beneficiaries (Riddell and Robinson, 1995). However, Young (1993) looked
at a number of paraveterinary programmes, mainly run by NGOs, and
found that the services were used even when the full market price was
charged. Elsewhere the picture is mixed; there is evidence that demand
for veterinary services decreases as price increases (Cheikh, 1997; Lee
Koma, 1997), but other evidence shows that income levels are not
correlated with the use of veterinary services. Moreover, caution is needed
in extrapolating from these results because some veterinary services may
be generally purchased by higher income groups not typical of the farming
population as a whole.
Increased involvement of the commercial sector provides, in theory, an
approach for improving efficiency. This need not be restricted to the
provision of private goods, but may also apply to partnerships with the
public sector in the provision of public goods and services. Goods and
services with public good characteristics can be privatized with close
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monitoring and regulation to ensure access for all, including the poor
though the burden of regulation to ensure that private companies live up to
their mandates may be onerous. Sub-contracting state services to the
private sector may be a more feasible option.
Accountability
Accountability is ‘institutionalized responsiveness to those who are
affected by one’s actions’ (Carney, 1995a, p. 7). As such, it is closely
associated with effectiveness, public action and participation. Political
accountability, i.e. the responsiveness of decision-makers to the demands
of society, can be expressed through the ballot box. This provides both a
‘voice’ and an ‘exit’ mechanism – voters can articulate their needs through
their choice of candidate, and vote out a poorly performing candidate.
Consumers of goods and services in competitive markets respond to
providers through their willingness to pay for a particular brand or product.
Consumer pressure can be introduced to public services to some extent
by cost-recovery systems. Examples include a research department
charging for seed services, or a levy on an export crop to pay for
extension. In some situations these may work well, but their relevance to
poorer farmers is limited by (i) their inability to pay and (ii) difficulties in
developing effective cost-recovery systems for public-good services such
as extension. Moreover, where subscription is compulsory (as with an
export levy), payment does not really constitute a vote of confidence in the
service provided and if there is no alternative provider, there is no exit
mechanism. Nonetheless, there is growing interest in such mechanisms,
largely generated by the budgetary pressures faced by many public
services, and this is an area which is likely to grow in importance.
There is increasing recent experience of participatory governance
mechanisms, which allow users a role in setting the agenda for public
institutions and in judging the results. In agricultural research, for instance,
it is becoming increasingly common for planning and review meetings to
be attended by NGO or community organization representatives. Whilst
these people may not necessarily talk to the issues which preoccupy the
poorest, it does signal a welcome move towards greater accountability and
inclusiveness in the way that (some) public institutions are run.
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In Benin the Ministry of Health has given local health management
committees’ decision-making control over resources. Committee
members are elected democratically; anyone may serve, provided
that at least one member is a woman... Representatives of local
committees sit on the board of the government’s new drug
procurement agency, which is one way of keeping the agency
accountable, and on the Health Sector Co-ordinating Committee,
which gives local representatives a voice in national policy. (World
Bank, 1997a, p. 119)
DEFINING ROLES FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
Over the past 30 years, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have seen
a shifting balance between the public and private sectors. Although some
of these changes have been irrelevant to the poor and particularly to the
poorest, many have been affected by changes in agricultural policy and
services. People living in remote areas benefited from the subsidies
implicit in pan-territorial crop pricing policies and other marketing services
provided, at least to the extent the parastatals were able to deliver on
these policies. However, despite this, the poor have mostly remained poor,
and the poorest of the poor have generally been least well served by
formal institutions.
The recent history of sub-Saharan Africa indicates that neither excessive
statist policies nor excessive laissez-faire can work. Clearly, a balance is
required between the state and the market. The state has fundamental
economic and social roles, though the effective performance of these roles
requires the state to reform, whilst the private sector and the market
remain important to increase economic efficiency and growth. The state
and the market are complementary. There are legitimate roles for both
market and state, often in partnership. The challenge is to define the most
effective balance.
There is a growing consensus in donor organizations for a partnership
approach to development, with the state working together with NGOs, the
commercial sector and people’s organizations, with the comparative
advantage of each being exploited by the others. The process of state
withdrawal from traditionally publicly provided services is ongoing. It is a
critical time for assessing the relative merits of the public and private
sectors in service provision. What emerges is not necessarily conclusive; it
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depends very much on local circumstances, in particular the relative
strengths and weaknesses of different providers (be they public or private,
NGO or community, formal or informal) in different countries and different
sub-sectors.
Role of the public sector
There remains a strong need for continued state involvement in protecting
the poor and providing services for the poor. A decline has occurred both
in those areas where the state still has a legitimate role, and in those
areas where it does not. A much more proactive involvement is required
(potentially well suited to a decentralized model), with the state both
providing those services not provided by the private sector due to market
failure, and regulating markets to produce socially desirable outcomes. An
argument can be made for intervention in the market to increase equity:
targeted subsidies and asset redistribution. [Land reform can be market-
assisted where it is the responsibility of the state to promote reform and to
provide guidelines, enabling conditions, and finance, but the actual land
transfer is a market transaction. The experience in South Africa will
provide an important test of this model, though the initial indication is that
transfer is taking place more slowly than planned (Carney, 1997).]
The economic rationale for the division of goods and services between the
public and private sectors can have potentially dangerous repercussions
for the poor if it results in the complete withdrawal of the state from
specific sub-sectors. The low purchasing power of the poor, the difficulty in
physically reaching some or many of the poor, and the relatively small
quantities of goods and services demanded by the poor will tend to
dissuade the private sector from servicing the poor, even for those goods
and services which are prime candidates for privatization. Continued state
involvement will be essential in such cases, whether acting independently
or in conjunction with the private sector. [Neoclassical economics has it
that the production and trade of all goods and services for which there are
competitive markets should be carried out by the private sector, because
the market economy will allocate resources efficiently. However, for the
provision of public goods, where those not paying for a service cannot be
excluded from its consumption and/or one person’s consumption does not
reduce its availability to another, state provision may be necessary. In
addition, state intervention may be justified where markets are
uncompetitive due to market failure. The main causes of market failure
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are: (i) externalities, in production or consumption, such that their costs or
benefits are not fully reflected in market prices (for instance, polluting
industries are not necessarily required to pay for the damage they cause);
(ii) natural monopolies (for instance, in a sector prone to economies of
scale – hence the tendency for consolidation); and (iii) imperfect
information, which may restrict market access or assign unfair advantage
and market power to one party over another.]
Where services have been provided by the state they have often been of
poor quality or badly targeted. For example, newly independent African
states inherited research and extension systems oriented towards the
needs of commercial farmers, cash crops and high-input farming. There
has been considerable ongoing change and re-orientation in research and
extension, but there is still insufficient use of participatory and sustainable
methods to understand the needs of poorer, small-scale farmers (often
women) living in more marginal areas. With the increasing policy focus on
poverty reduction, not only is there a need to improve the provision of
these services, but there is a need to redirect their focus. More research
and extension focused on the poor would involve research into sustainable
agriculture (low-input, food security crops, regenerative practices); support
to innovative extension systems (linking research, extension and farmers,
including farmer-to-farmer exchanges); and support to farmer training in
their own communities (Hinchcliffe et al., 1996). For the state,
decentralization measures and bottom-up planning could enable more
demand-led and appropriate research and extension. Bazeley (1993)
found that decentralized research and extension systems have resulted in
programmes with a greater impact on production.
Similarly, the public sector has usually controlled common livestock
diseases. It is in the interests of the state to ensure that adequate
measures are taken to prevent the spread of livestock disease because an
epidemic may threaten the livelihoods of many people and have far-
reaching economic effects. Public provision of these services has been
perceived to be largely inefficient (Holden et al., 1996), but some
governments have managed to control these diseases (such as rinderpest
outbreaks in Tanzania and Kenya). However, vaccination programmes in
some countries have been biased towards profitable exotic livestock
belonging to commercial producers, rather than the predominant but less-
profitable smallholder production. Consideration should also be given to
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livestock which are important to the poor as a source of subsistence or
cash income.
Increased participation in the public sector: the role of
decentralization
Decentralization has long been considered a remedy for inefficient
governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Potentially it may:
. provide policy-makers with better information on local problems and
needs, and on the nature of poverty;
. permit resource allocation which more closely reflects the needs of
different areas and groups;
. strengthen links between local communities and central government;
and
. foster constructive local-level partnerships between government and
other groups.
Decentralization can be categorized according to degree: from
deconcentration, to delegation, to devolution (see Box 6). Crucial
questions need to be asked of decentralization policies: what activities are
to be transferred? what types of decision (allocation of funds, etc.)? To
whom are powers given – political appointees, elected representatives,
local leaders? What form of power is transferred – judicial, administrative,
political? Are the qualified people available to manage the planned
structures?
Box 6 Different types of decentralization
. Deconcentration: transfer of management responsibility within the
bureaucratic organizations of the state. Local government has
responsibility for the implementation of central programmes, and
has no financial powers.
. Delegation: clearly defined functions are made the responsibility of
relatively independent organizations – organizations (such as
parastatals) are given rather wide discretionary powers and are not
directly controlled by superior hierarchical levels.
. Devolution: strengthening of sub-national units, with a defined legal
existence. Responsibility to local constituency
Parker and Kirsten (1995)
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There are few examples to date of successful decentralization in sub-
Saharan Africa. Following independence, local government established in
preparation for self-rule was variously neglected, weakened or abolished
as federal governments centralized and consolidated their power
(Development Administration Group, 1996). Lack of adequate funding was
the single most important factor which undermined local government
during this period (Parker and Kirsten, 1995).
Box 7 Incorporating local needs into district planning: a case
study from Ghana
A renewed effort to decentralize was launched in Ghana in 1988, as a response to the
inability of the centralized system to achieve economic growth and overcome poverty,
particularly in the rural areas. Although the decentralization policy has succeeded in
transferring power from the centre to the district level, it has yet to develop mechanisms for
the integration of local people’s needs into district planning, thus limiting its potential impact
on poverty.
Lessons:
. lack of human and physical resources has constrained planning processes in district
authorities
. lack of training at local level has hampered the collection of revenues, whilst funds
from central government have been limited
. incompatibility between new political/administrative boundaries and traditional
boundaries
. information flows between different levels of the administration have not worked well
. horizontal information flows between different sectors are poorly coordinated
. local people are not sufficiently aware of the planning and decision-making process,
and may be hesitant in involving themselves, especially women and the poorest.
This experience strongly suggests that there is still a lot to be learnt about how effectively
to involve local people in local government.
Recommendations:
. the government needs to provide a strong legislative framework, together with
financial and human resources
. need to improve information flows, both vertical and horizontal
. functions and skills of Assembly Persons must be redefined and improved, especially
in methods for contact with communities; they must become accountable to the
communities and their work must be transparent
. greater awareness-building is required at the local level, with people encouraged to
participate and speak out
. mechanisms for including all the community need to be developed, such as the
establishment of women’s groups
(Schiewer, 1995)
26
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS02 - 130399/NRI Institutional Development.3d
29/5/01 09:21 By Colin Wragg Page 31
Decentralization in Africa in the 1970s was mainly concerned with
administrative deconcentration. Local government officials then would have
been appointed; now they may be elected. Local governments in the
1970s lacked power and a real role in decision-making. They lacked
resources, and typically were not able to raise revenue independently of
central government.
It is too early to judge fully the success of the more recent decentralization
schemes, which are being implemented along with other initiatives to
improve democratic processes. Recent experience in Ghana provides
some useful pointers (see Box 7). South Africa is also interesting and
should be monitored closely to see how it progresses; likewise the process
in Uganda which is currently at an early stage. The effect on poverty is
important, and analyses of decentralization processes so far have not
focused on this issue.
South Africa . . . has now emerged into the mainstream of African
institutional development with a massive programme of restructuring
and strengthening of local government, which is clearly going to play
a central role. A cardinal feature is the fact that the new system
resulted from a negotiated settlement of all the local stakeholders,
and is thus a creation as much owned by the locality as a central
prescription. The civic and community organizations built up in the
70s and 80s give added depth to the system, though there is a need
for them to preserve their independence and build their resources.
The role of local government is very clearly extending into the
promotion of economic development and the critical need to
generate additional resources from the private and community
sectors. (Development Administration Group, 1996, p. 14)
Failings of decentralization
For decentralization to take place at all, the existing power base at the
centre must agree to relinquish some of its power. This is the major
dilemma. It can result in a cyclical process of establishing and abolishing
local government because of a constant tension between central control
versus the mobilization of active popular participation. True
decentralization and local government should be characterized by an
effective economic role in the major areas of public policy and intervention,
delegated budgets and the capability to manage them, representative
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decision-making, separate legal existence and the ability to allocate
resources. Two-way feedback between local and central government is
needed.
There are potentially significant development benefits of decentralization,
associated with local participation and empowerment. Yet these cannot be
realized without capacity-building in local authorities. Effective community
participation in decision-making and resource allocation demands new
skills of civil servants. The lack of skills and experience at local level, and
the difficulty in attracting people to work in provincial towns, lead many to
assume that the quality of governance will decline as a result of
decentralization. Furthermore, decentralization may, perversely, reduce
equity in situations where local governments can be easily ‘captured’ by
local elites. Small local elite groups are in a strong position to influence
local officials.
It is difficult to assess the impact of decentralization: problems may not be
due to decentralization per se, but to more general administrative,
economic and development factors (Conyers and Kaul, 1990), plus a lack
of capacity. The fact that it has not worked well to date may reflect more
on the implementation than decentralization itself. It may also be the case
that the extent of change in all levels of administration required in
decentralization has been underestimated. The establishment of
sustainable local bodies with real economic power entails quite radical
change in social and political organization.
Role of the private sector
The market reforms of the 1980s assumed that many of the services
previously provided inefficiently by the state would be taken up by the
private sector. In the agricultural sector, private involvement in input supply
and output marketing has in fact been highly selective (and heavily
oriented towards cash or export crops). Private provision of other
agricultural services, such as extension and research, has been even
weaker, though not completely absent. In some areas, community
organizations (including producer associations, cooperatives, grass-roots
organizations and customary institutions) and NGOs have taken on
services previously undertaken by the state. The extent of private
provision varies between countries, regions within countries, and sectors.
It reflects the differing degrees of liberalization, and other economic and
market factors which influence private perceptions of potential profitability.
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Commercial individuals/organizations
Private provision of goods and services for the poor in rural areas may be
severely limited due to (i) clients’ low purchasing power, and (ii) high
transaction costs (particularly in relation to risk and information). Risk
increases transaction costs, either directly when losses are incurred, or as
a result of strategies adopted to reduce risk. For example, a trader
advancing inputs on credit to a farmer risks non-repayment or must take
steps to enforce repayment (such as frequent visits to monitor harvest
dates). Similarly, information needs may be costly (or time-consuming).
Traders need to know which farmers have crops to sell, when they are to
be harvested, which markets will offer the best prices, etc. In remote
areas, with poor roads and no telephones, where multiple smallholders
produce rainfed crops, traders may judge transaction costs to be
prohibitively high.
In the livestock sector, clinical intervention, distribution of drugs and
vaccines, and diagnostic support are largely private veterinary goods.
However, where privatization programmes have been pursued, private
veterinarians have tended to locate in more lucrative urban markets, and
smallholder farmers in rural areas have been neglected. It may be
necessary to preserve a public role in rural areas if the needs of
smallholders are to be met. Equally, it may be possible to extend private
provision through partnership with paraprofessionals, permitting a
monopoly on drug provision, and developing other mechanisms to exploit
scale economies (Leonard, 1997).
Ways of improving the role of the private sector include partnerships and
links between the public sector, commercial individuals or organizations,
paraprofessionals and NGOs; and mechanisms such as subcontracting
and the provision of incentives by the public sector to encourage greater
involvement of the private sector. These partnerships are being
increasingly viewed as a way to provide agricultural goods and services on
a wider scale and address poverty reduction objectives. They will be
examined in more detail later in this paper.
Non-governmental organizations
The definition of NGOs used here incorporates both northern and southern
non-membership organizations, some of which implement activities in their
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own right and others that provide support to grass-roots organizations. The
focus is mainly on service organizations, but advocacy and networking
organizations are also important.
The role of NGOs has increased in significance, particularly in the 1980s
and 1990s, partly as a response to perceived state failure, but also
because of deregulation and donor initiatives permitting NGOs to flourish.
Donors recognize multiple roles for NGOs: in civil society; as
representative organizations which can balance the power of the state; as
part of a web of diverse (and competitive) providers of services; and as
sometimes more effective organizations through which to address poverty
issues.
Most developing-country NGOs engaged in service delivery are small
scale. Many work in communities where government and commercial
private providers are weak or non-existent. NGOs can be significant actors
in efforts to reduce poverty, and are said to have a comparative advantage
in being able to reach the poor and improve their lives. However, it is
difficult to reach an overall conclusion on the impact of NGOs on poverty
because of lack of data, the influence of external factors on the outcomes
of interventions, and lack of agreed methods of assessing impact.
Farmer groups and community organizations are increasingly used (or
strengthened or established) by NGOs and donors. The experiences of
some of these groups in agricultural service provision and institutional
development are examined here. However, it should be borne in mind that
there are many other group forms which are not NGOs (including
indigenous groups and groups supported by government).
Generally NGOs do not provide goods and services themselves, preferring
instead to establish associations among farming communities. They may
be well placed to take on tasks which are economically unattractive to
private firms, such as acting as a channel for inputs and credit, as well as
the additional role of empowering local people. In the case of veterinary
services, NGOs have been involved in training paraveterinarians and
strengthening the indigenous capacity of associations so that they are
capable of financing the delivery of goods and services. However, there is
less evidence from Africa than Asia on NGOs forming new groups or
targeting the poor, or of the importance of social and political objectives
(Riddell and Robinson, 1995).
30
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS02 - 130399/NRI Institutional Development.3d
29/5/01 09:21 By Colin Wragg Page 35
The majority of evaluations carried out on the impact of NGO projects on
the poor have found that NGOs generally fail to reach the poorest
(Tendler, 1987; Clark, 1991; Carroll, 1992; Riddell and Robinson, 1995).
Those which have benefited the poorest have achieved it through rigorous
targeting of beneficiaries, concentration on small activities (such as small
loans), a high level of consultation with project staff, small numbers of
beneficiaries and the involvement of whole communities, i.e. for common
property resource projects (Riddell and Robinson, 1995).
It is widely held that NGOs have failed to reach the poorest because the
landless poor can be assisted only by employment-generation schemes or
land reform, and the very poor (sick, elderly, not economically active) are
usually beyond the reach of most economic interventions and need
improved social services. It is the next level of the poor, who are
scattered, disorganized, living in resource-poor areas or dependent on the
less poor for employment and credit, who could benefit from economic and
institutional interventions, and thus might be the target for poverty
alleviation projects and programmes.
Many of the factors underlying successful NGO activities are characteristic
of small-scale projects, but some authors argue that there is no reason
why larger projects should not adopt them. On the other hand, many of
the constraints facing NGOs (see Box 8) concern issues of replicability,
wider impact and scaling-up (Brett, 1992; Riddell and Robinson, 1995).
Edwards and Hulme (1992) concur that there are good reasons for scaling
up the activities of NGOs, though this is not always easy.
Box 8 Constraints/limitations of NGOs
. the poor are reached more than the poorest
. men benefit to a greater extent than women
. little evidence that beneficiaries have broken out of self-
reproducing spirals of poverty
. costs are higher than previously claimed
. limited potential for sustainability
. limited potential for replicability
. tending to work locally and not to expand impact through
promoting change in public policy
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The general conditions under which NGO projects are more successful are
detailed in Box 9 (Riddell and Robinson, 1995; Riddell et al., 1995; Perrier
and Norton, 1996).
Box 9 Conditions for successful NGO projects
. beneficiary participation
. effective management
. skilled and committed staff
. favourable external environment
. carefully prepared and designed projects
. flexibility, process approach
. simplicity (in strategy and structure)
. appropriateness
NGOs often play a key role in developing group activities. Conditions for
successful group activities have also been identified and are highlighted
below; some of these mirror the conditions for successful NGO projects.
. Matching skills and experience so as not to exceed current
management skills of groups. Groups involved in marketing and
procurement tend to be more successful than those involved in joint
ownership of assets (for production and sale). For production, group
action is more effective in the provision of capital, training and
information than the activity itself. Group methods work better for
services benefiting from economies of scale to which people feel
access should be open.
. Internal dynamics of group, internal cohesion and a member-driven
agenda.
. Strong business rationale and relationships with the private sector
(Brett, 1992; Stringfellow et al., 1997).
However, there is still a need for a special focus on the poorest (in
particular women). Not everyone has a voice in groups, especially women
because of their workload, lack of land rights and skill constraints; and the
poorest because collective enterprises require higher levels of skill (Brett,
1992; Batterbury, 1994).
The impact of NGOs could be improved by scaling up their activities, but
constraints to organizational growth (managing change, and not
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undermining the comparative advantage in reaching the poor afforded by
being small and flexible) need to be taken into consideration. Moreover,
NGO activities may be fragmented and designed to address specific
needs of different groups, so are not easily amenable to scaling up.
Nonetheless, there may be ways in which the impact of NGOs can be
extended, by working with governments, using NGO projects as pilots for
larger schemes, and linking people at the grass roots with lobbying and
advocacy. Partnerships and links between all organizational levels are
increasingly recognized as necessary for coherent programmes, wider-
scale activities and facilitating poverty alleviation strategies. This will be
further explored in the next section.
Community-based groups and farmer organizations
Farmer cooperation, especially among those having commercial
potential, is widely perceived as one mechanism of improving their
access to agricultural services. By working together farmers can
realize the scale economies of bulk acquisition and enter into more
stable relationships with suppliers or traders. By pooling resources to
invest in transport or processing operations they can become more
active participants in the marketing systems, adding value to their
production. In recent years this view has influenced the design of
many programmes of assistance to smallholders in Africa to the
extent that donors and NGOs have often made group formation a
prerequisite for accessing project resources. Additionally, from the
donors’ perspective, there are significant advantages in distributing
project resources to groups rather than to individuals, as costs are
lower and resources can be disbursed more rapidly. (Stringfellow et
al., 1997, p. 1)
However, projects promoting farmer cooperation do not always lead to the
emergence of viable farmer groups. Stringfellow et al. (1997, p. 1) made
the following recommendations for sustainable farmers’ groups.
. Donors wishing to promote farmer cooperation should refrain from
rushing the process of group formation or from overburdening groups
with too many or too complex functions. They should avoid providing
subsidized credit or grants, but instead encourage farmers to develop
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their own forms of group organization, based on an analysis of their
own situation and the resources at their disposal.
. Assistance should be provided in establishing links to banks, input
suppliers and markets. Indeed, smallholders’ access to markets for
high-value commodities can be greatly enhanced through group
lending activities organized in conjunction with outgrower schemes.
The prospect of default is a deterrent to organizing such schemes,
however, and there is therefore a need to develop new risk-sharing
arrangements.
. Donors need to adapt their project planning procedures to the nature
of farmer-controlled enterprises. Traditional quantitative measures of
project achievement may not always be appropriate, especially in the
early stages of a project.
Community organizations are sometimes able to achieve economies of
scale in service delivery. This has enabled some to provide fully qualified
veterinary services to their members and to reach farmers not previously
reached by government. Similarly, various experiences with
paraveterinarians have shown that they are able to reduce delivery costs
and increase coverage, thereby increasing social and economic benefits.
Some community organizations have also been able to provide public
goods, such as research and extension, or dipping facilities which have
wide impacts (i.e. by preventing the spread of disease, which could affect
animal and human health). The limitations of these activities are similar to
those experienced by NGO projects: benefits may be localized and small-
scale; professional resources and skills can sometimes be limited; and
enforcing collective decisions and action on public goods is problematic.
Sub-contracting public sector work to private practitioners.
The provision of goods and services with externalities may require some
form of state management. Inefficiencies in direct provision by the public
sector have led to subcontracting arrangements being adopted in certain
circumstances.
In the area of veterinary services there are examples of successful
subcontracting of vaccination programmes to the private sector (e.g.
private-sector contractors in Bolivia and Chile for foot-and-mouth disease,
and paraveterinarians in Chad). The scale of inefficiencies under public-
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sector provision has often resulted in cost reductions when these services
have come under private provision, which is clearly beneficial in terms of
coverage and availability to the poor:
In Morocco, sub-contracting state vaccination programmes to private
practitioners reduced vaccination costs by 34%, increased the
proportion of animals vaccinated from 52% under public sector
programmes to 66% under private schemes and provided a valuable
source of income to private practitioners who might otherwise not
have been able to remain in practice. (de Haan and Umali, 1992,
cited by Holden et al., 1996, p. 39)
In other cases, private veterinarians have been contracted by the state to
provide certain public functions, and public servants have engaged in
private activities (Umali et al., 1992). In either case, there have been
advantages over public provision of the services because the individuals
have personal profit incentives to work. Furthermore, where the
transaction costs of these semi-private systems are lower, farmers may
benefit from lower-cost services or wider coverage.
Role of public-private partnerships
A prominent part of current thinking on the roles of the public and private
sectors is that the comparative advantage of different organizations must
be taken into consideration, and ‘pluralist’ solutions are widely advocated.
Thirtle and Echeverria (1994) point out several criteria for defining public
and private activities, and that efficient institutional arrangements will be
specific to particular activities or target groups. Public and private
contributions should be viewed as complementary investments rather than
substitutes. There is often a need to enhance the public role through
partnerships with the private sector, or for the public sector to provide
incentives to enhance the private-sector role (e.g. public-sector investment
to ‘crowd-in’ the private sector), and for greater links between institutions
to increase impact.
Yet in practice it may not be easy to develop effective partnerships
(Carney, 1996). Steps which can be taken to facilitate effective
partnerships have been identified. Each party needs to invest in
understanding the other. When working with governments, the constraints
of the system (lack of resources, poor motivation, slow-changing systems
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and structures) need to be accepted at the outset. Progress may be slow.
Good relationships are essential, as is investing in partnerships so that
they remain dynamic.
NGOs are small players when it comes to influencing governments,
compared to bilateral and multilateral donors. However, greater success
may be achieved if NGOs allow governments to take credit for progress in
policy and programme development. NGOs can also complement or
provide a counter to the considerable influence of the larger donors
through coalitions reinforcing each other’s influence and through
concentrating their attention at central ministry level. The strategy must be
approached with care:
[The] decision to work with (but not for) government must be based
on the ‘reformability’ of the structures under consideration, the
relationship between government and citizens, the level at which
influence can be exerted most effectively and (for international
NGOs) the strength of the voluntary sector (Edwards and Hulme,
1992, p. 18)
Partnerships, although still in their infancy in many places, have proved
beneficial. Two case studies (see Boxes 10 and 11) provide examples of
successful partnerships between the state, NGOs and local communities.
They have led to greater efficiency, improved motivation (both government
and rural communities) and empowerment of local communities. In the
Cantarranas project (see Box 11), participation in planning and
implementation enabled a focus on local needs, and the use of villagers
for extension and training activities reduced costs and meant that the
project achieved wider impact.
The Cantarranas project was careful to avoid using direct subsidies. This
differs markedly from many other examples where capacity building is
subsidized, at least for a time. Although a case can be made for carefully
targeted (and non-permanent) subsidies to address particular issues (e.g.
increased use of inorganic fertilizer by resource-poor farmers in Africa), ill-
considered and widespread use of subsidies can create a culture of
dependency, undermine the sustainability of interventions and crowd out
commercial activity in areas where it is sorely needed.
In sum, there seem to be a variety of possibilities for poverty reduction.
They require professionally functioning and flexible institutions to succeed.
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Yet institutions often find it difficult to fulfil their mandates or respond to
developmental challenges. In the next section, important factors internal to
the institutions are discussed with a view to improving their capacity to act.
If these are successfully tackled then institutions should be better placed
to respond to some of the key challenges.
Box 10 The Production through Conservation Programme
(PTC II) Lesotho
This is a Ministry of Agriculture initiative supported by the Swedish
International Development Authority to encourage farmers to improve
husbandry of their land, so as to achieve better conservation and
production. It aims to do this by fostering self-sustaining rural
communities capable of planning the development of their own
resources for sustained use.
The programme promotes institution-building from village level
upwards, facilitating flows from the village and village development
council to the District Agricultural Officer, the Board of Farmers, the
District Development Council and on to the various national ministries.
The programme specifically sets out to raise interest and create
demand among villages, whilst increasing the supply of information,
goods and services to satisfy these demands.
There are strong feelings among rural people that they do not like plans to
be made for them by others and so they are now fully involved in
developing joint plans with the Area Teams. It had been expected that
‘encouragement’ would be needed for villagers to implement resource-
conserving practices. Instead farm families are now stating what they wish
to do so, and thus pressing the government to give them support and help.
There have already been a wide range of impacts, particularly in the
government agencies. Staff are positively motivated by better relations
with farmers and by better exchanges with their colleagues. Because of
a better understanding of local needs, district planning and budgeting
can be more targeted on expressed needs, which should lead to more
efficiency in future. Other benefits include the elimination of
unnecessary journeys, and more efficient use of transport.
Adapted from Pretty (1995) p. 230, Case 14
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Box 11 World Neighbours in Cantarranas, Honduras
The Cantarranas Integrated Development Programme was a collective
effort between World Neighbours, the Ministry of Natural Resources,
ACORDE (a Honduran NGO) and Catholic Relief Services. The
programme focused on soil conservation in areas where maize yields
were very low and where shifting cultivation, malnutrition and out-
migration prevailed.
Factors in the success of this programme:
. paternalism was avoided (nothing was given away, no subsidized
farmer activites or inputs)
. it started slowly and on a small scale, so that local people could
participate in planning and implementation
. limited technology was used, appropriate to the local area, and
fine-tuned through experimentation by and with farmers
. extension and training were carried out largely by village farmers,
making it possible to reach a large number of farmers
The adoption of velvet bean has tripled maize yields. Labour
requirements for weeding have been cut by 75%. The focus on village
extensionists was not only more efficient and less costly than using
professional extensionists, it also helped to build local capacity and
provide crucial leadership experience.
Adapted from Pretty (1995) p. 220, Case 4
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4
NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
REQUIRED
Institutional change or development is considered crucial for successful
and widespread implementation of poverty reduction programmes. Areas
have been identified where action is required, and examples provided of
specific actions which have yielded good results. In this section, specific
measures are proposed better to equip institutions in the fight against
poverty.
Chambers (1997, pp. 221–237) and others have highlighted the problems
faced when seeking to change institutions. Chambers focuses on the need
for personal change and a new kind of professional, committed to
reversing paradigms and ‘putting the last first’. Much of this requires
fundamental attitudinal change. It is difficult to imagine such changes
within government bureaucracies in the foreseeable future. There are too
many vested interests, particularly relating to individual power and
corruption.
Here, a more modest agenda is proposed which aims to improve
institutional effectiveness by a number of straightforward, practical steps.
These take account of the status quo and limited scope for rapid change,
but gradually move the system towards the required longer-term reversals.
Although the focus here is the RNR sector, these actions are equally
relevant to other sectors. In fact, inter-sectoral cooperation is essential for
success. The action areas are divided into two principal groups.
. Inter-institutional – coordination of policy development and vertical
integration. These areas must be addressed in order to develop
achievable and coherent strategies for poverty reduction which can be
monitored and managed.
39
P
O
L
IC
Y
S
E
R
IE
S
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS02 - 130399/NRI Institutional Development.3d
29/5/01 09:21 By Colin Wragg Page 44
. Intra-institutional management – capacity building, and changes in
approach and attitude. These areas must be addressed in order to
increase the likelihood that coherent strategies will be adopted and
properly implemented.
Both inter- and intra-institutional actions must take place concurrently to
promote coherent development processes capable of effecting sustained
poverty reduction.
Table 1 categorizes institutional types and shows areas where action is
required to improve poverty focus and consideration of gender. Although
organizations in the same category may have broadly similar needs,
individual institutional assessments would be needed to provide detailed
pointers on need. Table 1 assumes that the community-level organizations
are willing and well-motivated development partners, and so are, for
instance, already trying to be poverty-focused and inclusive. Each of these
areas is explored in more detail below.
Table 1 Summary of action areas and the degree of action required
for different types of institution
Type of
institution
Intra-institutional actions Inter-institutional actions
Capacity
building
Approach
and attitude
change
Incentive/
disincentive
system
Policy
coordination
Coordination
Donors Major Major Some Major Major
National/
government
institutions Major Major Major Major Major
Commercial
organizations Some Some Major Some Major
Private
development
institutions Some Some Some None Major
Community-
based
organizations Major Some None Some Some
COORDINATION
It is important that actions both within and between the various institutions
are coordinated and integrated so as to be mutually supportive and that
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those organizations which represent or work closely with the target group
are able to inform the actions of ‘higher-level’ organizations.
At the grass-roots level, this requires the involvement of all or most
organizations, regardless of sector or nature of interest (e.g. NGO, private,
farmer organizations, local representatives, government or public services,
research services) and implies a facilitating role to kick-start (and possibly
maintain or occasionally revitalize) this coordination. It is not clear who
should perform this role, and this may vary depending on local
circumstances. A government/NGO partnership might be an effective
provider, with each partner bringing different perspectives and
competence, and the partnership itself underlining the commitment to
dialogue and coordination. As always, finding mechanisms to include and
represent the poor and the poorest will be the particular challenge, but will
probably be easier at the local level, where the poor are likely to be a
more visible constituency, than at other levels.
Depending on local circumstances, apex structures might usefully collate or
represent fragmented project experience across a number of sectors or
institutions. In local government, the community development unit sometimes
performs this role, at least with regard to the provision of public services (in,
say, agriculture, health and education). In some areas, there have already
been initiatives to instigate a process of dialogue across sectors and interests
sometimes facilitated or convened by a locally active NGO. Commercial
interests may be represented by the local Chamber of Commerce although,
in practice, its constituency may not include rural areas.
The results of this ongoing consultation process should then inform higher-
level decisions. This link is made easier where there is genuine
decentralization. Where this is not the case, it will require willingness and
flexibility on the part of the national organizations (particularly public
sector) to take account of local views. This is unlikely to work consistently
well unless there is explicit recognition of the need to use local-level
processes to inform higher-level actions, reinforced by management
processes and systems which facilitate, monitor and reward this, and a
supportive institutional culture. In some countries, the time has never been
better for this, with so much institutional change intended to foster greater
participation and improved effectiveness.
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Table 2 suggests some of the processes within and between organizations
required to encourage greater sharing of information, and more coherence
in their activities and focus, reflecting local needs and priorities. Some of
these ideas come from the management literature and might seem out of
place to some local-level organizations but the concepts which underpin
them are still relevant, and could be introduced (in an incidental way) as part
of the facilitation process needed to bring local-level organizations together.
Table 2 Actions to improve coordination
Type of
institution
Actions required Main actors
Clear delineation
and sharing of
responsibility
Joint
planning
Clear reporting
and messages
Donors Delegation of
decision-making
Provide
planning
framework
Provide more funds
for communication.
Share reports
Management
National/
government
institutions
Delegation of
decision making.
More management
staff
Bring
together
concerned
parties
Improve message
presentation
Senior officials.
Management
consultants
Commercial
organizations
Sharing decision-
making with
partners
Plan and
fund
commercial
inputs to
projects
No action
necessary
Commercial
management
Private
development
institutions
Delegation of
decision-making
Improve
coordination
Share reports Management
Community-based
organizations
More management No action
necessary
No action
necessary
Management
BUILDING CAPACITY TO ADDRESS POVERTY AND GENDER
ISSUES
When looking at institutional performance the first (and often extremely
difficult) step is recognizing the need for reform. The next is to assess
management needs and undertake management training. These actions
are rarely taken systematically.
A needs-driven capacity-building programme is important. In the past, this
was rarely considered since it requires high-level commitment to a
programme with poor visibility. Improved staff efficiency at a regional office
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does not make the front page of a newspaper. Now, agencies such as
UNDP are recognizing that capacity-building is critical to their poverty
reduction programmes (UNDP, 1995, pp. 29–30). This applies not only to
partnerships with government, but also to NGOs and community groups. It
is particularly important in the RNR sector where institutional linkages are
often weak and ineffectual.
Table 3 shows the actions required to implement a capacity-building
programme. This follows a similar process to that increasingly adopted in
community development programmes. It is essential to understand clearly
that the process must be allowed to run its course if it is to succeed.
Capacity building may be a suitable candidate for grant-funded assistance
because the pay-offs are long-term and indirect.
Table 3 Capacity building programme actions
Action Responsible parties
Needs assessment (within the organization
and to canvass views outside, e.g. amongst
client groups) to identify recruitment, training
and material needs plus a means to monitor
and evaluate the process
Institutional development consultants
Purchase of equipment Donor or institution
Official training programmes, especially human
resource development
Training consultant.
National, regional and international training
institutions
Field-level process support Institutional development consultants.
National field teams
Capacity-building programmes should emphasize gender issues. A large
proportion of the poorest are women, and their interests are currently
under-represented in institutions at all levels. The specific actions to
address gender issues given in Table 4 are based loosely upon
experiences in the Philippines where gender mainstreaming actions have
been under way for many years (Valdeavilla, 1995). These would benefit
from statutory protection to prevent gains made being reversed under
different political circumstances (Edwards, 1988, pp. 39–52). Without such
provisions, poverty reduction programmes are unlikely either to achieve or
sustain satisfactory levels of improvement.
Capacity building may add to management costs. There may be a need
for ongoing in-service training, or the establishment of an internal
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monitoring unit; critics argue that these higher costs are often
unsustainable beyond the life of a project. For capacity building to be
effective, it must draw on realistic resource levels.
Table 4 Specific capacity-building actions to increase gender
representation
Action Responsible parties
Well budgeted gender and development unit
within each institution
Institution management with donor support
Positive discrimination in recruitment practice Institution management
Specific training programmes to upgrade
women’s skills to the same levels as men
Training consultant.
National, regional and international training
institutions
A good management information system (i.e. one that is simple and
therefore used) may provide managers with the information to enable
appropriate and timely action. Management information tends to be poor in
most institutions. There is over-reliance on official reports or subjective
impressions. In donor organizations, managers may be over-stretched,
having portfolios covering many countries and projects. Inevitably, much
project monitoring is superficial. Budgetary and fiscal-year pressures mean
that project managers often focus on financial indicators. Yet donors are
increasingly concerned with social indicators, which provide important
information on progress towards Development Assistance Committee
targets. (In 1996, following a number of inter-governmental meetings, the
donors signed up to targets on poverty reduction, social development and
environmental sustainability and regeneration. The social development
targets included: universal primary education by 2015; elimination of
gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005; reduction in
infant and maternal mortality rates (by 67 and 75%, respectively) by 2015;
and access for all to reproductive health services, through the primary
health care system, by 2015.)
Historically, social indicators of achievement have been undervalued and
few organizations know how to collect them. The result, with respect to
poverty reduction, is illustrated by the World Bank analysis of Country
Assistance Strategies (World Bank, 1997c) where it was shown that
poverty reduction had not been properly addressed for several years. A
carefully designed management information system might help
implementing institutions and project managers to recognize poverty focus
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as a potential problem, permitting corrective action to be taken at an early
stage.
This situation could also be alleviated by better use of management tools
such as logical frameworks with milestones (as used by DFID), and by
more and better-trained managers. There is a dilemma here: development
organizations are rightly called to account over how they spend their
resources, and increased investment in management rather than in ‘sharp-
edge’ activities is usually interpreted as detracting from their development
mission and effectiveness. And in NGOs, where there are more managers
on the ground, the experience has been similar.
There is increasing emphasis in DFID, after the 1997 White Paper on
International Development, to meet poverty and human development
targets by the 21st century. In preparation of country strategies, the
incorporation of human development targets is encouraged. The
integration of these targets forms part of the institutionalization process of
a poverty eradication focus within DFID’s work.
APPROACH AND ATTITUDE CHANGE
It is not simply the design of the intervention that matters; attitudes are
also key. Preconceptions concerning the poorest may include some or all
of the following, that:
. they are dirty, poorly dressed persons who carry disease;
. women are second-class citizens;
. they are stupid, uneducated and difficult to train;
. they are unreliable;
. they are living in places which are not nice and are difficult to visit;
. they are people who cannot pay bribes;
. they are unlikely to generate success in any programmes implemented
with them; and
. they are not the sort of people who earn promotions for those working
with them.
This kind of prejudice is not confined to those working in their own
societies. It also applies in many instances to project design and
implementation, where the poorest are omitted because it requires too
much time and effort to work with them. It is rare indeed that poverty
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focus, and particularly extreme poverty focus, is retained from planning
through to implementation. When determining the ways in which
institutional change can result in effective poverty alleviation and
eradication programmes, it is thus essential to take account of the
attitudes of those responsible for taking action. There are several ways
this can be achieved.
The World Bank and UNDP have emphasized a change of language.
Poverty has now become the over-arching principle of both organizations.
Within this, gender issues are given priority. Staff may not discuss action
without including poverty. The rhetoric of development in these
organizations is now one of poverty. This does not mean that action
results, but it may reinforce a change of emphasis. Another example of
this was seen recently in Uganda. Background to the Budget 1998/9
(Budgeting for Poverty Reduction 1998).
The second step is for institutions to become ‘learning organizations’
(Chambers, 1997, p. 224). Chambers outlines six areas for action to
achieve this:
. Commit with continuity – enabling conditions include a favourable
policy and staff stability.
. Network with allies – change-minded people from different
organizations should gain strength from each other.
. Start small and slowly – this will not threaten people.
. Fund flexibility – spending targets should be removed, and more
should be spent on exploration, training, learning, capacity building
and processes of institutional change.
. Train, encourage and support grass-roots staff.
. Build out and up from grass-roots success.
Some of these are primarily dependent on initiatives by individuals within
organizations. Within certain types of institution (such as NGOs) it might
be possible to change rapidly the structure in order to promote these
actions. However, within larger and more monolithic structures it is difficult
to see how such actions will become routine unless there has been a very
slow and patient effort by individuals, with strong support from
management. Moreover, two of the steps (funding flexibility and starting
small) may conflict with widely used expenditure targets and budgetary
planning procedures.
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The third step is to have specific departments and posts in which poverty
and gender components of projects are critically assessed and monitored.
DFID has been pioneering in the extent to which it uses social
development advisers in its work (see Box 12). The internal reorganization
of the World Bank has ensured that country programmes are vetted by the
social unit before they can be implemented. Many donors now have
gender units at country level which ensure that gender issues are taken
into account. As yet, there are few poverty-focused units which have a
central role in programme formulation and approval, but this must change
imminently given the current focus on poverty alleviation. Governments
and national organizations should be encouraged to commit to and place
poverty and gender at the top of their agendas.
Table 5 gives some examples of incentives and disincentives which could
be used to reinforce a change of culture. Their use does not require
special skills if the institution is well-organized. However, prior to
implementation, an appraisal of how the incentives can be applied to
poverty reduction programme implementation is required.
Table 5 Incentives and disincentives to good work
Action Description
Incentives
Salary increases Higher salaries for persons willing to work in difficult or remote areas
Performance bonuses Extra money paid for reaching agreed targets
Promotion Increasing responsibility and rewards for those performing well (but
beware of promoting people to jobs beyond their capacity or outside
their realm of expertise)
Official recognition Responsibility for certain areas of work; announcements in newsletters,
notice boards, certificates, etc.
Disincentives
Reprimand, demotion
and dismissal
Radical action which needs to be taken more often if poor performance
is to be discouraged
Transfer Move persons to places where their inputs are less critical
POLICY COORDINATION
It is clear that a great deal can be achieved through policy coordination
and harmonization. Three issues are particularly important: how grant and
loan funds are used; the extent to which donors should channel funds
through local organizations; and the capacity and willingness of
organizations to coordinate their activities.
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Box 12 Institutionalizing a poverty focus in DFID
The move to a greater focus on poverty eradication within DFID has been largely influenced
by the work of the Social Development Department, and the adoption of a social
development-oriented approach, which in turn is a reflection of overall changes in
international development paradigms. The Social Development Department itself has rapidly
expanded in the last decade (this is demonstrated by staff expansion from just two social
development advisers (SDAs) employed in 1988 to 38 in 1997).
The institutionalization of a pro-poor approach has been achieved through the provision of
social development advice based on three elements:
. a set of issues (poverty, gender, participation, social capital, marginalized groups,
livelihoods);
. specific analytical professional background grounded in non-economic social
sciences; and
. expertise in a set of applied field methodologies (participatory planning, qualitative
research, stakeholder analysis, field project skills).
Recent mechanisms for systematizing the pro-poor approach within the whole organization
include the production of reports on different methodologies, such as stakeholder analysis
in the project cycle and on approaches to participation, gender equality, and participatory
poverty assessments. Other innovations have included creating information and
communications/media posts; developing an internal research strategy to assess the
approaches and risks of projects in terms of social development goals; introducing an SDA
training strategy; carrying out formal evaluations of DFID activities; and developing an
intranet for the DFID’s Social Development Department.
A policy information marker system (PIMS) has been used since 1993. This uses strict
criteria to score projects on the basis of their contribution to key development concerns. A
PIMS marker on gender equality (different from previous Women in Development markers)
was developed in 1997, and a marker for children’s rights is currently in the pipeline.
Good project-cycle management is now seen to involve stakeholder consultation at an early
stage, although matching practice to theory is a significant challenge. Recently, interest has
been expressed within DFID in the practice of social auditing – a process which is aimed at
improving accountability to stakeholders.
Larger project proposals are scrutinized at a higher level of DFID management (including,
above a specific threshold, by the Projects and Evaluation Committee) than are smaller
projects. At the concept-note stage, larger projects are appraised by the Chief Social
Development Adviser of the relevant geographical desk (much easier now that SDAs have
been appointed for all the different geographical regions).
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Donor views on the use of grant- and loan-based funds
. Loan funds should be used in areas where the recipients feel that the
investment made will have a significant economic return (e.g.
infrastructure for economic development, such as rural roads).
. Grant funds should be used to support important activities which
cannot currently be the top priority of recipients because of severe
budgetary constraints (e.g. institutional and community development).
. Programmes will be stronger and more coherent if the
complementarity between grant and loan funds is exploited by donor
organizations.
. Clear and consistent distinctions between activities which may be
grant- and loan-funded will (i) reduce the tendency for loan recipients
to look for the best deal among competing donors, and (ii) encourage
more efficient utilization of funds.
The extent to which donors should channel funds through
local organizations
Two issues predominated when this question was discussed with
representatives of donor institutions. These are issues that mostly concern
large donor institutions, although certain smaller NGOs might face similar
problems.
Firstly, should donors be active themselves at the field level, or should
they work through other local organizations? The argument presented was
that if the donor has weak capacity actually to respond to the demands of
participatory processes and monitor them, then it is better to work with
better placed partners or subcontractors. An example is the funding of
NGOs and community-based organizations for participatory project
implementation. Such subcontracting arrangements require that donors
should have the capacity to assess the capability of partner institutions.
Secondly, should donors seek to significantly increase programmes which
work directly with the poor and poorest, or should they focus on
programmes which have indirect impacts on poverty? An example given
was the urgent need to improve rural infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa.
Rural road-building projects, in particular, could be managed and
monitored by donors in close coordination with national partners.
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There is no single answer. The appropriate approach will depend on local
circumstances and the organizations present. Coordination is clearly
important such that key areas are not completely overlooked, and
responsibilities match institutional competences and resources.
The capacity and willingness of organizations to coordinate
their activities
There are many examples of different institutions implementing competing
programmes to tackle the same problem in the same area. Rural credit is
typical: community members are sometimes able to choose between
diverse packages on offer. Coherence rather than competition will come
about only if the institutions make certain changes.
Table 6 Actions to improve coordination
Type of
institution
Actions required Main actors
Defining limits to
activities funded
Direct or indirect
funding
Harmonize
activities
Donors Country-level
agreements with
all parties
Establish capacity
plus strengths and
weaknesses
Good MIS.
Persons
appointed with
coordination
function
Management
National/
government
institutions
Inter-Ministerial
and Departmental
cooperation
Establish capacity
plus strengths and
weaknesses
As above Senior officials
Management
consultants
Commercial
organizations
Awareness of
business
opportunities
Financial planning
to include
assessment for
grants and
subsidies
System to feed
information into
the MIS of other
institutions
Commercial
management
Private
development
institutions
Country and
regional level
agreements with
all parties
Establish capacity
plus strengths and
weaknesses
Good MIS Management
Management
consultants
Community-
based
organizations
Local agreements A community-level
issue
Persons
appointed with
coordination
function
Management
Table 6 indicates the actions required to improve coordination. The main
responsibilities lie with donors and governments. Note that although there
is a role for management consultants in this process, northern
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management consultants may be inappropriate for development
programmes if they are unable to take into account different social and
cultural conditions. What is needed is a combination of relevant
management and social skills. Yet, as with the earlier discussion
coordination between different types of organization, this is only likely to
be sustained where there is a facilitator of this process, and where the
need for such coordination is recognized as an intrinsic part of the policy
development process.
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5
CONCLUSIONS
Persistent poverty in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that the policy
framework and associated institutions have yet to achieve effective
mechanisms for poverty alleviation and elimination. The manifest failure of
earlier state- and public sector-driven models, especially in agriculture, has
led to the focus upon liberalization and reliance on private-sector
provision. However, the liberalization process itself has overestimated the
extent and speed at which private sector provision can replace that of the
public sector agencies.
More recent thinking therefore emphasizes a continuing, if diminished, role
for the state, which is coupled with a much broader array of institutional
partners. In part this represents a more interactive and collaborative role
between public- and private-sector agencies. The public sector can
contribute to the enabling environment for private-sector activity (e.g.
through provision of infrastructure, legal and financial legislation), and also
more directly in partnership, for example complementing the private sector
in the provision of agricultural services.
There is also a need, especially within the natural resources sector, for
interaction with other bodies, notably NGOs and farmer or community-
based institutions. This need is most acute where attempts are being
made to involve the poorest of the poor, although even grass-roots bodies
may have difficulty in providing an effective interface. Selected NGOs may
provide the capability to target and work with local communities and the
poor, either as agents of government (or donors), or in partnership with
government and/or private-sector agencies. Farmer or community-based
institutions may be critically important in helping to improve participation
and representation in development initiatives, from planning to
implementation and appraisal.
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The move towards greater decentralization cuts across the diversification
in institutional engagement noted above. Decentralization potentially
provides an array of benefits, not least the possibility for much greater
local influence in development activity. Such initiatives, however, also
entail both a radical change in social and political systems and a
substantial improvement in local institutional performance. It is an open
question whether decentralization per se will provide a more effective
model than other approaches which encourage a greater role and
effectiveness for bodies such as community- or farmer-based enterprises.
In any event, social and political commitment towards local empowerment
is likely to be more important than the institutional detail of particular
models.
Development of institutional effectiveness and capability is a central theme
whichever institutional model is to be followed. This paper has indicated
four areas of action to strengthen institutional performance: improved
coordination within and between organizations; capacity building to
strengthen poverty focus; changes in attitude and approach; and
coordination of policy. Within these, capacity building is of particular
importance and may require technical assistance. Even more difficult may
be the improvement in coordination and collaboration between bodies
which until now have followed largely separate agendas. There is a need,
for example, to overcome the suspicion of many public agencies over
collaboration with the private sector, or that of NGOs, with respect to both
private- or public-sector partners. In targeting the poor and the poorest,
new and more imaginative initiatives to engender institutional collaboration
will be needed.
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